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THE NATION'S unemployment  rate  has  risen  to new post-Depression  highs 
since 1980. But at the same time the number of persons receiving 
unemployment  compensation  benefits has been unusually  low relative 
to the total number of unemployed. Two types of state and federal 
programs are involved in this development: regular unemployment 
benefits  and  extended and supplemental  benefit  programs. 
The regular  unemployment  compensation  program  provides  benefits 
for a duration  of about six months (twenty-six weeks) to workers on 
temporary  or permanent  layoff and  to certain  unemployed  workers  who 
quit  theirjobs  forjust cause. Extended  and  supplemental  unemployment 
compensation  programs  provide  benefits  lasting  three  or  more  additional 
months  to workers  who exhaust their  regular  benefits. 
During  the recent  recession  the number  of recipients  of regularjobless 
benefits  was low in comparison  to the number  of workers  who lost their 
jobs. This development  affected the insured  unemployment  rate (IUR), 
which  is one of the nation's  two most important  measures  of slack in the 
labor  market.  The IUR is essentially the number  of recipients  of regular 
benefits  divided by the total number  of jobs covered by the unemploy- 
ment insurance  system.' Since the numerator  of this ratio is available 
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1. Technically  the numerator  is the number  of continued  claims  for  regular  unemploy- 
ment  insurance,  as explained  below. 
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within  ten days of the close of each week, the IUR  provides  a very timely 
indicator  of changing labor market conditions and is widely used to 
assess slack in the labor  market. 
Monthly  movements in the IUR have been historically  quite similar 
to movements  in  the total  unemployment  rate  (TUR).  The  latter  measure, 
which is the nation's best known indicator  of labor  market  slack, is the 
ratio of all active job seekers, including  persons on layoff, to the total 
civilian  labor  force. The TUR is published  monthly  by the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and is based on survey responses in a national 
probability  sample  of about  60,000  households  in the Current  Population 
Survey. 
The developments of recent years in the regular unemployment 
insurance  program  have caused a sharp  break  in the relation  between 
the IUR and  TUR. In 1982,  when the TUR was 9.7 percent,  the IUR was 
only 4.7 percent, or 5.0 percent  lower. By contrast,  in 1975  the IUR was 
only 2.6 points lower than  the TUR-5.9  percent  versus 8.5 percent. 
This sharp  decline in the ratio  of insured  to total unemployment  rates 
may indicate deterioration  of one or both measures as an indicator 
of labor market  tightness. It is important  to establish whether  this has 
occurred  and, if so, which  measure  is more  reliable.  Both  unemployment 
indicators  are used in a wide variety  of policy applications.  The TUR is 
accepted  by many  policymakers  and  the public  at large  as the best single 
indicator  of the current  state of the economy. The IUR is the basis for 
triggering  extended and supplemental  unemployment  insurance, for 
measuring state and local unemployment  rates, and for distributing 
federal  funds  under  a variety  of programs.  If either  statistic  now  provides 
a misleading  picture  of labor  market  conditions, the use of the statistic 
in policymaking  should  be changed. 
In addition  to the decline in the fraction  of unemployed  persons who 
are receiving regular  unemployment  compensation,  there has been an 
even sharper  drop  in the fraction  of unemployed  receiving  benefits  under 
extended  and supplemental  programs.  As a result  the fraction  ofjobless 
workers  receiving  all types of benefits  was lower in 1981-82  than  in any 
other postwar recession. The contrast with experience in the 1975-76 
recession is especially striking.  In calendar  year 1975,  a little more  than 
78 percent of the unemployed  were covered by regular,  extended, or 
supplemental  unemployment  insurance.  In  calendar  1982  only  45  percent 
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Table 1.  Unemployment  Insurance Outlays, Selected Fiscal Years, 1975-82 
Item  1975  1976  1980  1981  1982 
Federal  outlays on all unemployment  insurance 
programs  (billions  of 1982  dollars)a  22.57  30.78  20.98  20.95  23.76 
Total unemployment  rate (percent)  7.3  8.0  6.8  7.4  9.1 
Insured  unemployment  rate (percent)  5.0  4.9  3.7  3.4  4.3 
Average  number  of civilian  unemployed 
(millions)  6.81  7.60  7.25  8.02  10.02 
Sources:  Budget of the United States  Government, Fiscal  Year 1977, and Budget of the United States  Government 
for fiscal years  1978, 1982, 1983, and 1984; U.S.  Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings  (various issues). 
a.  Figures derived using the Payments  for Individuals deflator as published in the  1984 budget. 
The countercyclical  stimulus  provided  by unemployment  insurance 
was also considerably  lower in the more recent recession, as shown in 
table 1. In  fiscal 1976,  when  only 7.6 million  were  unemployed,  the nation 
spent almost $31 billion (1982  dollars)  on all unemployment  insurance 
programs.  Last fiscal year, when unemployment  averaged 10 million, 
less than $24 billion was spent on these programs.  Thus the amount  of 
countercyclical  stimulus  dropped  by nearly  one-fourth  though  the num- 
ber of unemployed  was higher  by one-third.  The real compensation  per 
unemployed  worker  fell by over 40 percent. 
The decline in countercyclical  stimulus  and income protection  pro- 
vided by unemployment  insurance  in part reflects a conscious policy 
choice by the president  and Congress  to reduce the scope of extended 
and supplemental  unemployment  benefits.2  The effect of these policy 
changes was compounded by the low level of IUR relative to TUR 
because a state's eligibility for extended unemployment  benefits is 
determined  by its insured  unemployment  rate. 
In  this  paper  I examine  the pattern  of insured  and  total  unemployment 
over the past three decades and attempt  to explain their recent diver- 
gence. The paper begins with precise mathematical  definitions  of the 
TUR and IUR, followed by an examination  of their historical  relation. 
Using information  on the regular unemployment  insurance program 
provided  by the Unemployment  Insurance  Service and  the BLS, I show 
2. In 1981  the national  trigger  for extended  benefits  was eliminated  and  the trigger  for 
extended  benefits  at  the state  level was raised  considerably.  Federal  supplemental  benefits 
are of shorter  duration  and were begun at a later point in the business cycle than the 
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why the IUR/TUR ratio varies over the business cycle and over time 
and  suggest  some reasons  why it may  have shifted  so abruptly  after  1980. 
The subsequent section focuses on insurance  coverage under the ex- 
tended  benefit  and supplemental  benefit  programs.  The countercyclical 
stimulus  and  income  protection  provided  by these last two programs  are 
especially important  when the average duration  of unemployment  is 
long, as it is at the end of a deep recession. The paper  concludes with a 
summary  of policy implications. 
Insured and Total Unemployment  Rates 
The regular  unemployment  insurance  system provides two weekly 
statistics of wide interest to labor market  analysts and economic fore- 
casters:  the insured  unemployment  rate  and  the level of initial  claims  for 
unemployment  insurance  (UI). Initial  claims are filed by job losers and 
job leavers to notify the unemployment  insurance  office that a spell of 
unemployment  or underemployment  has begun. If the initial  claimant 
has had no recent experience of unemployment,  the office determines 
eligibility  and, for unemployed  or underemployed  workers  who qualify, 
computes  a benefit  award. 
In most states, workers must be unemployed  for one week before 
becoming  eligible  for payments. After that week's delay, job losers file 
"continued"  claims  for additional  weeks of benefits.  Job  leavers, if they 
are eligible for benefits at all, must usually wait several weeks before 
benefits  commence.3  Applicants  who qualify  file continued  claims until 
they stop searching for work, become reemployed, or exhaust their 
claim to compensation. In most states, workers exhaust their regular 
compensation  after about twenty-four  to twenty-six weeks of benefits, 
although  the duration  of those benefits varies by state and depends on 
the specific  work  history  of the  individual.  In states  in  which  the extended 
benefit  program  is in effect, claimants  who have exhausted  their  regular 
unemployment  benefits may continue receiving payments under the 
extended program.  Similarly,  when a supplemental  federal program  is 
in  effect, workers  who have  exhausted  both  regular  and  extended  benefits 
become eligible for supplemental  benefits. Beneficiaries  under  the ex- 
3. Many  states do not permit  persons  who quit their  last  job to draw  benefits.  In the 
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tended and supplemental  programs are excluded in computing the 
insured  unemployment  rate. 
To be eligible  for benefits,  an initial  claimant  must  have a recent  work 
history meeting certain minimum  requirements.  These requirements 
vary considerably  across states. Workers  must have had covered earn- 
ings in a minimum  number  of recent quarters,  have attained  a minimum 
level of total earnings, or have both to be eligible.4  In determining  a 
worker's eligibility status, states typically take account of covered 
earnings in the first four of the most recent five completed calendar 
quarters.  Consequently,  unemployed  persons who are new entrants  to 
the labor  market,  reentrants  with no recent work history, or  job losers 
and  job leavers with only brief recent employment  histories  will not be 
eligible for benefits. Unemployed workers who claim benefits, then 
become reemployed without exhausting them, and then again lose 
their  jobs within  a year of the start  of their  first spell of unemployment 
can resume receipt of payments under  their first benefit award.  These 
payments can continue until workers exhaust their initial twenty-six 
week award.  At the start  of the next benefit  year, which  begins  fifty-two 
weeks after the start of workers' first spell of joblessness, they may 
become eligible  for a new benefit  award  if enough covered wages have 
been accumulated.  But workers  who become unemployed  twice during 
a single benefit year will often be eligible to receive fewer weeks of 
benefits  during  their  second spell ofjoblessness than  during  their  first. 
IUR  AND  TUR  DEFINITIONS 
As mentioned  above, the IUR is the ratio  of continued  claimants  for 
regular  unemployment  insurance  to the average number  of persons in 
covered employment  in four recent quarters.5  By comparison,  the total 
4.  Covered  earnings  are  earnings  paid  on  jobs covered  by the Ul system.  An estimated 
97 percent  of all paid  employment  is now covered  by the system. 
5. Technically  the  covered  employment  measure  provides  a count  ofjobs, not  persons. 
A single individual  may work in two or more  jobs, and each of that  person's  employers 
will separately  report  the worker's  earnings  to the unemployment  insurance  system.  Also, 
certain  recipients  of regular  benefits  are  excluded  in determining  the number  of continued 
claims.  Those  not  counted  are  recipients  under  the  unemployment  compensation  programs 
for federal  workers,  ex-servicemen,  and railroad  workers  covered  by the railroad  retire- 
ment  program.  Since  only a relatively  small  number  of unemployed  workers  is covered  by 
these programs,  they will be ignored  in the remainder  of this section. 
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unemployment  rate  is the number  ofjob losers,  job leavers, labor  market 
entrants,  and  reentrants  who are  unemployed  divided  by the  total  civilian 
labor force, which includes both the currently  employed and unem- 
ployed. More  formally, 
'Ut  (1)  IURt  =  100, 
CEt 
where 
tt-7  7CE 
CEt=  E 
i=t-18  12 
and 
(2)  TUR  -  U  100, 
where IUt is the number  of insured  unemployed  and underemployed  in 
month  t; CEi is the number  of employed  workers  covered by unemploy- 
ment compensation in month i;  Ut is  the total number of  civilian 
unemployed;  and  Et is the total number  of civilian  employed.6  Given  the 
differences  in definition,  there is no reason to expect the two measures 
will coincide in a particular  month. 
Obviously the total number of unemployed, Ut, must exceed the 
number  of insured  unemployed,  IUt, because the latter  excludes all new 
entrants,  most reentrants  andjob  leavers, and  nearly  alljob losers whose 
file wage and payroll  information  required  for the calculation  and administration  of the 
unemployment  insurance  payroll  tax. Because this information  takes several months  to 
collect  and  compile,  the measure  of covered  employment  used  in the IUR  is always  several 
months  out of date. In computing  the IUR, the Department  of Labor  uses a four-quarter 
moving  average  of covered employment.  At the beginning  of each calendar  quarter,  this 
information  covers the period  from eighteen  to seven months  before  the current  month; 
by the end of a quarter  it covers the period  from  twenty  to nine  months  before  the current 
month.  For excellent  descriptions  of the IUR, see Gloria  P. Green,  "Measuring  Total  and 
State Insured  Unemployment,"  Monthly  Labor  Review, vol. 94 (June 1971),  pp. 37-48; 
and Saul J. Blaustein. "Insured Unemployment  Data," in National Commission  on 
Employment  and Unemployment  Statistics,  Counting  the Labor  Force, appendix,  vol. 2: 
Data  Collection,  Processing  and Presentation:  National  and Local  (U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office, 1979),  pp. 198-252. 
6. About 6 percent  of regular  UI recipients  in a given week are partially  rather  than 
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current  spell of unemployment  is longer  than  twenty-six  weeks.7  Hence 
the numerator  of the IUR is smaller  than  that of the TUR. The denomi- 
nator  is also smaller,  because it excludes the unemployed  and  also those 
employed persons (such as the self-employed)  not covered by unem- 
ployment  insurance.  Furthermore,  because it is based on a lagged  value 
of employment, it will be a couple of percentage  points smaller than 
current  employment  any time that employment  is growing  rapidly,  as it 
was in the late 1970s. 
The historical  relation  between the insured  and total unemployment 
rates is shown in figure 1. One feature  of the relation  is apparent  upon 
casual inspection:  the ratio of insured  to total unemployment  rates has 
been declining  for the past three decades. Until 1955  the two rates were 
very  similar.  Since  that  time  there  has  been  agrowing  divergence  between 
the two rates, and the divergence  has accelerated  since 1980.  Both the 
trend  and cycle reflect changes in the composition  of the unemployed. 
But these changes fall well short of explaining the sharply growing 
divergence  between the two rates since 1980. 
To understand  the historical  relation  between the IUR and  TUR, it is 
useful to partition  the total change in their ratio between a change in 
covered employment  and a change in covered unemployment.  Defini- 
tions 1 and  2 can be combined  to yield 
IURt  IU,  (Et +  Ut) 
(3)  TUR,  Ut  CEt 
During  the three decades from 1951  to 1980  the IUR/TUR  ratio  fell by 
about 40 percent, from 0.91 to 0.54. During  that same span the ratio  of 
the civilian  labor  force to UI-covered employment-the ratio  in brack- 
ets-fell  by about one-third. This decline was caused by a series of 
revisions  in federal  and state UI laws that  have progressively  broadened 
the population  covered by unemployment  insurance.  (The  fraction  of all 
civilian  employment  covered by UI rose from 58 percent in 1951  to 87 
percent  in 1980.)  Other  things  equal,  the fraction  of unemployed  covered 
by the program  would be expected to rise along with the fraction of 
employed  who are covered. However, in the same thirty-year  span, the 
ratio  of insured  to all unemployed,  IU/U, actually  dropped  from  48 to 44 
percent. 
7. However, a small number  of part-time  workers  receiving  partial  unemployment 
benefits  are  counted  among  the insured  unemployed  even though  they would  be excluded 
from  the CPS  count  of unemployed. 00 
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DECLINING  RATIO  OF  INSURED  TO  TOTAL  UNEMPLOYED 
The main cause of the decline in the ratio of insured  to total unem- 
ployed before 1980 was the changing demographic  composition and 
industrial  attachment  of the jobless. In the mid-1950s  nearly  half of all 
unemployed workers were men over the age of twenty-four. These 
unemployed tend to be experienced workers who are job losers and 
hence eligible for  jobless benefits. Over the 1960s  and 1970s  prime-age 
men came to represent a sharply lower fraction of all unemployed, 
dropping  to about one-quarter  of the total in 1973-74. Young men and 
women under twenty-five years who are much more rarely eligible 
represented  a much  higher  fraction,  with the fraction  of all unemployed 
who are under age twenty-five rising  from less than a third in 1951  to 
over a half  in 1973-74.  The result  of this demographic  shift, not surpris- 
ingly, was a decline in the ratio  of insured  to total unemployed. 
In addition,  during  this same period  there was a shift in the nation's 
industrial  structure  away from industries  in which UI coverage ratios 
were high. Goods-producing  industries  such as mining,  manufacturing, 
and contract construction  have declined in relative importance  while 
service-producing  industries  have grown. Even with the extensions in 
UI coverage mandated  by federal law, a relatively low proportion  of 
unemployed workers from service industries is covered by jobless 
benefits. Although the limitations in available data do not permit an 
estimate of their separate effects, it is likely that the combination  of 
demographic  and industrial  shifts can account  for the secular  decline in 
the IU/U ratio  over 1951-80.8  However, no abrupt  shift in demographic 
8. The  effects  of the  demographic  and  industrial  shifts  can  be estimated  from  published 
information  about  UI coverage  ratios  among  specific  demographic  and industrial  groups 
of the unemployed.  With the assumption  that these ratios remained  constant  over the 
1951-80  period,  one must multiply  the coverage  ratios  by the fraction  of unemployed  in 
the respective  groups  in 1951  and 1980  and  then compute  the predicted  ratio  of coverage 
for the entire  population  of unemployed  in those two years. Exercises of this type, using 
coverage ratios for 1960, 1967, 1973, and 1977  as baselines, show that industrial  and 
demographic  shifts  together  can  account  for a substantially  larger  decline  in the IU/U ratio 
than  the  one that  actually  occurred.  The  discrepancy  is explained  by the  fact  that  Congress 
has extended  UI coverage  over 1951-80,  so coverage  ratios  for some individual  groups  of 
unemployed  workers  rose over the same period.  Without  the UI extensions, the decline 
in the IU/U ratio  would  have been much  greater. 234  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
and industrial  patterns has occurred since 1980 to correspond  to the 
sharp  relative  drop  in IU/U since that  year. 
The cyclical pattern  in the IU/U ratio stems from a different  kind of 
distributional  effect. At the onset of a recession, firms  discharge  a large 
number  of workers, most of whom will be eligible  for jobless benefits. 
During  this phase of the cycle, job losers account  for a rising  percentage 
of all unemployed, and the ratio of insured  to total unemployed  rises 
rapidly. As  the recovery begins, workers on temporary layoff are 
recalled, although  the number  of unemployed  new entrants  and reen- 
trants  may continue  to mount.  The ratio  of insured  to total unemployed 
begins to fall and continues to do so until  business conditions  (and the 
TUR) stabilize. If the slump is protracted,  the ratio of insured  to total 
unemployed  will also fall as discharged  workers  begin  to exhaust  regular 
benefits, about six months after the beginning  of a downturn.  Thus a 
decline  in the number  of insured  unemployed  may not necessarily  signal 
the start of a recovery in the labor market.  It may only reflect the fact 
that the recession has become so lengthy that many  job losers have 
dropped  out of the ranks  of the insured  unemployed. 
POST-1979  EXPERIENCE 
Secular and cyclical changes in the composition  of the unemployed 
appear  to account  for most if not all of the fluctuations  in the IU/U ratio 
before 1980,  but do not explain  experience since that year. To examine 
the most recent experience  it is useful to focus on only a certain  portion 
of the civilian unemployed-job  losers.9 Before 1980 the number  of 
jobless who were covered by unemployment  insurance was usually 
within a few percentage  points of the number  of unemployed  who lost 
their last jobs within the past twenty-six weeks. The correspondence 
between these two statistics should  hardly  be surprising.  New entrants, 
reentrants,  and persons unemployed  longer than twenty-six weeks are 
hardly  ever eligible  for regular  UI, and  only a small  fraction  of voluntary 
job leavers qualify  for benefits.  Consequently,  the IU/U ratio  has varied 
9.  In fact, it would  be worthwhile  to examine  the entire  postwar  relation  between  the 
number  of regular  insured  unemployed  and  the number  of job losers. Information  on the 
number  ofjob losers among  the unemployed  only dates  back  to 1967,  however, so it is not 
possible  to analyze  this relation  much  beyond  the period  covered  in the text, that  is, 1968 
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over time and varies over the business cycle in much the same way as 
the ratio of short-term  job losers to total unemployed,  a ratio denoted 
here as LU26,,,k/U. Reliable CPS information  about the number  of job 
losers goes back to about 1968.  A regression  using quarterly  data (not 
seasonally  adjusted)  for 1968-79  gives the following  (standard  errors  in 
parentheses): 
IU_  LU2w  (4)  o0.00094 +  1.082.  U  ;  R2 = 0.908. 
U  (0.01880)  (0.050) 
Since the constant  term is almost zero, the regression  indicates  that at 
any  point  in time, and  with  only minor  disturbances,  IU/U is 108  percent 
of LU26  ,,JU. The number  of insured  unemployed  exceeds that  of short- 
term job losers for several reasons. The former includes part-time 
workers receiving partial unemployment insurance, who constitute 
about  6 percent  of UI recipients  in an average  week, and  it also includes 
individuals  who voluntarily  left their  last  jobs but  for reasons  that  made 
them eligible for regular  unemployment  benefits.10  Both these groups 
are  excluded  from  the CPS count of short-term  job losers. 
As noted above, the results in equation  4 are based on experience  in 
1968-79. Since that time there has been an abrupt  shift in the relation 
between the total of insured  unemployed  and recent  job losers, which 
corresponds  to the recent decline in the IUR/TUR  ratio.  The magnitude 
of the shift  is estimated  by extending  the period  covered  by the previous 
regression  up through 1982:3  and using dummy  variables  for the past 
three  years (D8082,  a dummy  variable  with the value of 1.0  for quarters 
in 1980-82;  and  D8182, a dummy  for quarters  in 1981-82): 
(5)  U  = 0.001  +  1.077  L1U263Dk  808  [L2U26k 
(0.001)  (0.050)  (0.024)  - 
-0.132  [  U6k  D8182  R2 = 0.894. 
(0.028)  U 
According  to these results, the ratio of insured  unemployed  to short- 
10. The results in equation 4 could presumably  be improved  by excluding these 
workers,  but  there  is no available  information  on UI-covered  workers  who are  job leavers 
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term  job losers declined  from its average  of 1.077  in 1968-79  to 0.974 in 
1980  and to 0.842 in 1981-82. Thus in 1981-82  the number  of insured 
unemployed  relative to short-term  job losers was down by 22 percent 
(0.235/1.077).  This implies that in an average week in 1982, about 1.1 
million  fewer  workers  received  regular  UI benefits  than  would  have  been 
expected on the basis of previous  historical  experience. 
There  are only a few reasons why the ratio  of insured  unemployed  to 
job losers falls. Among new job losers, fewer may be eligible  to apply. 
Among eligible  job losers, a smaller  number  may apply. Among appli- 
cants, a greater fraction may be  disqualified  before receiving first 
payment.  And among  accepted applicants,  the potential  duration  of an 
award  may decline. In trying  to decide which  of these has occurred,  one 
is faced with a serious limitation.  There  exists no nationally  representa- 
tive data  set containing  enough  information  to determine  who among  the 
unemployed  is eligible  forjobless benefits  and,  of those, who is receiving 
benefits. The ideal data set would contain work and benefit histories 
going back two and one-half  years. Earnings  histories dating  back that 
far might  be needed to determine  a current  benefit  entitlement.  Data on 
benefit  receipts during  the most recent year are necessary to determine 
who among  the unemployed  is receiving  benefits and who has already 
exhausted compensation  in the current  benefit year. In the absence of 
this kind of detailed information  one must rely on indirect evidence 
provided  by comparisons  of CPS and UI administrative  data. The CPS, 
however, does not even contain  current  information  identifying  recipi- 
ents of UI benefits. 
The CPS data identify the number  of new job losers monthly. (For 
this purpose a good indicator  is the number  of job losers unemployed 
fewer  than  five  weeks.) This  total  can  be compared  to the average  weekly 
number  of initial UI claims, IC, to determine  the probability  that job 
losers apply  for UI benefits.  The regression  below relates  quarterly  data 
on these two series for 1968:1  through 1982:3,  with dummy  variables 
again  used for the last three years: 
(6)  IC  =  -  16,937 +  0.382  LU5Wk  -  0.016  (LU5vvk  'D8082) 
(11,298)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
-  0.045  (LU5w,k  * D8182);  R2 =  0.965. 
(0.009) 
The negative  coefficients  on  L U5wk  * D8082  and  L U5wk  * D8182  imply  that Gary  Burtless  237 
initial  claims  were somewhat  lower than  usual in 1980  and  were sharply 
lower  than  normal  in 1981  and 1982,  by which  point  claims  were running 
about  16  percent  below the level that  would  be predicted  from  experience 
during 1968-79.11 
This  finding  implies  either  that  fewerjob  losers considered  themselves 
eligible  for benefits  or that, if they considered  themselves  eligible,  fewer 
bothered  to apply. (Note that initial  claims  may be filed  by persons  who 
later  turn  out to be ineligible.)  It is difficult  to distinguish  between these 
two possibilities. To shed light on this question I used CPS data to 
compare  job losers in the first  quarter  of 1982  with  job losers in the first 
quarter  of 1976. The year 1976 was chosen for comparison  because 
unemployment  at that  time was reasonably  high  (7.7 percent  versus 8.8 
percent in 1982:  1), and also because unemployment  had been high for 
nearly  a year and  a half. 
Job losers unemployed  fewer than  five weeks in 1976  were relatively 
more likely to be under age twenty than were identically  defined  job 
losers in 1982  (16 percent in 1976  versus 10 percent in 1982),  and they 
were less likely to be males over age twenty (54 percent versus 59 
percent). These demographic  differences suggest that a lower fraction 
of new job losers would claim  jobless benefits in 1976;  yet the actual 
fraction  filing  initial claims was about 17 percent higher.  Although  the 
standard industrial classification (SIC) codes of job  losers are not 
included  in data from the BLS, available  data can be used to compare 
the industrial  classification  of all unemployed  workers  in 1976  and 1982. 
These differences  do not appear  to be significant,  at least on the level of 
the one-digit  SIC code. 
Another  potential  difference  between 1976  and 1982  is that  job losers 
in the latter  year may have experienced  more  unemployment  during  the 
previous  period.  As mentioned  above, to be eligible  forjobless benefits, 
ajob loser must  have sufficient  covered earnings  in four  previous  calen- 
dar quarters.  If 1982  job losers experienced more  joblessness in 1981 
than 1976  job losers experienced in 1975,  a smaller  proportion  of 1982 
job losers would be eligible for benefits. Special tabulations  using the 
March 1976 and March 1982 CPS files provided no support for this 
hypothesis.  In the March  CPS, workers  were asked  to report  the number 
11. The reduction  in claims is (-0.016  -  0.045)/0.382 =  -  16 percent. Since the 
estimated  constant  term is very low in relation  to the average  number  of weekly initial 
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of weeks worked  in the previous  calendar  year. Based on the replies of 
615 respondents  in 1976  and of 1,165 in 1982, it appears  that new job 
losers in 1982  were employed  for more weeks during  the previous year 
than were 1976  job losers (thirty-five  weeks for 1982  job losers versus 
only thirty-two  weeks in 1976).12  Thus  there  appears  to be nothing  in the 
previous work experience, demographic composition, or industrial 
classification  of 1982  job losers to explain  their  low application  rate for 
unemployment  benefits. On the contrary,  the differences  between them 
and  job losers in 1976 are consistent with a higher application  rate in 
1982. 
Although  the 16 percent relative  decline in initial  claims during  1981 
and 1982  is very significant,  it may not be large enough to explain the 
entire  22 percent drop in the ratio of insured  unemployed  to job losers 
mentioned  above. To account for the rest of the drop, UI offices must 
either  have denied  benefits  to a higher  percentage  of initial  claimants  or 
have made benefit awards  of shorter  duration  to successful claimants. 
There is no evidence that an abnormally  high  fraction  of claimants  was 
denied benefits in 1980-82. In that period  only 13 percent of claimants 
was denied awards because of  insufficient wage credits. This is  3 
percentage  points below the comparable  rate over 1971-79. Similarly, 
the total  number  of benefit  denials  was in line  with  figures  for the 1970s.13 
Some evidence exists that the average  period  of benefit  awards  was 
briefer  in 1980-82  than  in earlier  periods.  It should  be recalled  that  there 
are two types of initial claims filed in a given week: those filed by 
claimants  who did not begin a previous spell of insured  unemployment 
in the previous year (categorized  "new") and those filed by claimants 
who received benefits in the past ("additional").  (The latter  claimants 
file additional  initial claims, which are included in the total count of 
initial  claims.) The Unemployment  Insurance  Service compiles statis- 
tics on the potential  length  of benefit  awards  made  to successful new UI 
claimants.  Virtually  no trend  in  the average  duration  of these new awards 
has been apparent  in the past several years. It has remained  around 
twenty-four  and  a half  weeks for the past decade. However, the fraction 
12. In both  cases the  job losers considered  are  those who reported  being  unemployed 
fewer than  five weeks on the March  CPS. For  job losers unemployed  more  than  five but 
fewer  than  twenty-six  weeks there  appears  to be virtually  no difference  in  work  experience 
during  the previous  year  (1975  and 1981). 
13. The number  of denials  as a fraction  of monetary  determinations  was 32 percent  in 
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of claimants  who have previously  received benefits  has risen sharply  in 
the past three years. The ratio of these additional  claims to all initial 
claims averaged 37 percent from 1971 through 1979, but rose to 42 
percent  in 1980-81  and to 47 percent in 1982.  Because these additional 
claimants  have already  used up a portion  of their  potential  benefit  award, 
their  potential  weeks of benefits  under  the additional  claims  will  typically 
be less than for new initial  claimants.  Hence the rise in the number  of 
additional  claimants  probably  implies that among all initial claimants, 
new as well as additional,  there has been a decline in the duration  of 
expected benefits. 
The  analysis  up to this  point  suggests  two main  reasons  for the decline 
in the ratio  of insured  unemployed  to short-term  job losers in 1980-82. 
Fewer new job  losers are applying for benefits and, among initial 
claimants,  the expected length  of benefits  has declined  because a higher 
fraction  has recently received benefits. There is no evidence that the 
demographic  composition, industrial  classification,  or recent work his- 
tory  of 1980-82  job losers has caused the decline in coverage. Why  then 
has the number  of initial  claims  fallen? 
CHANGES  IN  UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE  ADMINISTRATION 
A number  of factors could explain the drop in new jobless claims. 
Several  legal and administrative  changes have been made in the unem- 
ployment insurance  system since the last major  recession in 1975-76. 
The most important  of these have been the significant  broadening  of the 
population  covered; a tightening  of eligibility  standards  for those who 
quit a recent job; the imposition of a high implicit tax on pensions, 
annuities,  and old-age insurance;  the imposition  of federal taxation  on 
UI benefits;  and the revision of the trigger  mechanism  for extended UI 
benefits.  Clearly  the first  of these reforms  should  have raised  the number 
ofjobless claims  in 1980-82. But since the newly covered workers  were 
employees  in  state  and  local  government  and  agricultural  establishments, 
it is not likely that the number  of initial  claims should have risen very 
much  in a recession. 
The tightening  of eligibility  criteria  for job leavers does not appear 
to me to be very significant.  A number  of states that  formerly  permitted 
quitters  to obtain benefits after a disqualification  period now prohibit 
them  from receiving  benefits. However, too few large  states have been 240  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
affected by this change for it to have much importance  in the recent 
recession. Also, if the trend were significant  one would expect initial 
claims to have declined in 1978-79  when  job leavers comprised  a large 
portion  of the unemployed  rather  than in 1981-82  when quit rates were 
lower. 
The revised treatment  of pension income under  the UI system could 
have some effect on older unemployed workers. Formerly, workers 
receiving private pensions or social security retirement  benefits were 
eligible  for full  jobless benefits  if discharged  from a job. Many  workers 
retiring  from a job or taking early retirement  benefits after being dis- 
charged  consequently  received  both UI and  a pension. By 1980  all states 
were compelled  by the federal  government  to revise this provision.  Now 
if a worker  is discharged  from  ajob and  accepts a pension  from  the firm 
that  put that  person  on layoff, UI benefits  during  the subsequent  spell of 
unemployment  are reduced by the amount of the pension. Similarly, 
social security  benefits  are now also counted  in determining  the level of 
a weekly UI award. This reform  should reduce the number  of jobless 
claims  filed  by older  unemployed  workers.  Available  information  on the 
characteristics  of the insured  unemployed  provides  some evidence for a 
decline in insured unemployment  among older workers. But because 
older  workers  represent  only a small  portion  of the unemployed,  even a 
major  impact  on their participation  would have only a limited  effect on 
total  jobless claims.  14 
Taxation  of unemployment  compensation  is probably  the reform  that 
has affected the value of jobless benefits for the greatest number  of 
potential  recipients. Married  couples with total incomes above $18,000 
and single individuals  with incomes above $12,000  are now required  to 
pay federal  taxes on some or all unemployment  compensation  received. 
Before 1979,  jobless benefits were exempt from taxes. The taxation  of 
benefits significantly  reduces their value to upper- and even middle- 
income  families. If benefit  taxation  is a significant  factor  in deterring  UI 
applications among otherwise eligible jobless  workers, it could be 
expected to have a disproportionate  effect on unemployed  workers in 
the upper  part  of the income  distribution.  It is unfortunate  that  regularly 
14. For example, in 1975  claimants  age sixty-five and older comprised  less than 5 
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collected information  about the income distribution  of UI recipients  is 
almost  wholly lacking.15 
The  most  recent  major  revision  in UI law  was the significant  tightening 
of the trigger  mechanism  in  the extended  benefit  program.  By eliminating 
the national  unemployment  rate  trigger  and  raising  the state trigger,  this 
reform  drastically  reduced  the availability  of extended benefits during 
the recent recession. But it has had no direct  effect on the operation  of 
the regular  UI program,  and it is consequently difficult  to see how it 
could affect applications  for regular  benefits. 
One  final  development  in  the UI system should  also be noted. Because 
of a relative cutback in administrative  funding  in the past two years, 
state employment security agencies have been forced to reduce the 
number  of offices in which employment  services are offered. This has 
principally  affected the Job Service, where the funding  cutbacks have 
been concentrated,  rather  than the Unemployment  Insurance  Service, 
which has responsibility  for handling  UI claims. Nonetheless, some of 
the closed offices probably  offered  both types of services. This cutback 
caused  some applicants  to travel  greater  distances  in order  to file claims, 
and probably  caused others to endure  longer waits to file their claims. 
The added  burden  of filing  a claim  may have deterred  some potential  UI 
applicants,  although  this effect was probably  small. One indication  that 
the UI system was not overwhelmed  by the recent recession is the fact 
that  the average  lapse between an initial  application  for benefits  and  the 
first  payment  stayed short throughout  the recession and remained  sig- 
nificantly  shorter  than  the lapse  during  the  previous  recession  in 1974-75. 
Although  none  of the administrative  or  legal  changes  mentioned  above 
appears  to be important  enough  to explain  a major  part  of the decline in 
initial  claims, some of them  may  have affected  the number  of weeks over 
which  benefits  were  received.  The  taxation  of UI benefits  and  the  cutback 
in extended benefits  may have reduced  some of the adverse incentives 
of unemployment  insurance  for labor  supply  and  thus  may  have affected 
the IUR/TUR  ratio. For example, the reduced  availability  of extended 
15. Information  about UI receipt is collected annually  in the March  CPS interview, 
when  respondents  are  asked  to report  the amount  of unemployment  insurance  and  all  other 
income  received  in the previous  calendar  year. UI benefits  are so poorly  reported  on this 
survey  that  I could  make  no reliable  comparisons  of the  income  distribution  of UI recipients 
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benefits may have caused workers nearing  the end of their period of 
regular  benefits to search harder  for jobs than did comparable  unem- 
ployed workers  in the 1975-76  recession, when benefits  under  regular, 
extended, and supplemental  programs  could extend up to sixty-five 
weeks. The best estimate  of the incentive  arising  from  shortened  benefit 
duration  is that  provided  by Moffitt  and Nicholson, who estimate  that a 
ten-week reduction in potential jobless benefits causes a one-week 
decline in the duration  of an average  spell of covered unemployment.  16 
Note that if the average  jobless spell of insured  unemployed  workers 
falls by a week, while the average spell of uninsured  workers  remains 
unchanged,  the overall fraction  of insured  weeks to all weeks of unem- 
ployment  declines. Consequently,  any reduction  in adverse incentives 
arising  out of UI may reduce  the ratio  of insured  to total unemployment 
in a given week. (The same effect, of course, could result from the 
reduction in the net earnings replacement  rate caused by the recent 
taxation  of UI benefits.) 
This review of the legal and  administrative  changes  in unemployment 
compensation suggests that the reform in the treatment of pension 
recipients  and  the taxation  of UI benefits  are the developments  with the 
greatest potential for reducing  applications.  The other changes either 
had  the reverse effect or deterred  applications  only slightly.  The relative 
rise in the number  of initial claims categorized as additional  and the 
recent  reduction  in  adverse  UI incentives  may  have  the  greatest  potential 
for reducing  insured  spells in comparison  to uninsured  spells of unem- 
ployment.  Unless the disposition  to apply  for  benefits  has  fallen  for  other 
reasons, such as increased program  stigma or lower need, the factors 
just mentioned  appear  to be the main  plausible  explanations  for current 
low rates of new claims and insured unemployment. Demographic, 
industrial,  and work experience  characteristics  among  recent  job losers 
do not appear  to account  for the low rates. 
16. Robert  Moffitt  and Walter  Nicholson, "The Effect of Unemployment  Insurance 
on Unemployment:  The Case of Federal  Supplemental  Benefits,"  Review  of Economics 
and Statistics, vol. 64 (February  1982),  pp. 1-11. This estimate  is restricted  to long-term 
job losers since it is based  on persons  who have exhausted  regular  and  extended  benefits 
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Insured Unemployment  under Extended and Supplemental 
Programs 
The previous section examined  possible determinants  of the insured 
unemployment  rate, which is based on the number of unemployed 
covered  by regular  UI benefits. Although  there  has been an unexpected 
decline in the fraction of unemployed  job losers covered by regular 
jobless benefits,  a major  reason  for the relative  drop  in the total number 
of persons  receiving  UI benefits  of all kinds  in 1981-82  has been the cut 
in programs  to help the long-term  unemployed-namely, the extended 
and  supplemental  programs.  As mentioned  above, the extended  benefit 
program  was recently  modified  to limit  the number  of states  participating 
in the program. Since October 1982, extended benefits have been 
available  only in states in which  the insured  unemployment  rate  exceeds 
5 percent  and is at least 120  percent  of the comparable  level in the two 
previous  years. States may also provide  benefits  when the IUR reaches 
6 percent,  regardless  of the rate  in previous  years. Before  October  1982, 
the extended benefit  trigger  rates were one percentage  point lower. In 
addition,  until 1981  the trigger  rates  were computed  by including  recipi- 
ents of both regular  and extended benefits in the numerator.17  Finally, 
before 1981 the extended benefit program  had a national  trigger  that 
permitted  all states to offer extended benefits  when the national  trigger 
rate  exceeded 4.5 percent. 
As a consequence  of the reforms  enacted  since 1981,  a smaller  number 
of states  offers  extended  benefits.  At the end of 1982  only fourteen  states 
with particularly  high insured  rates were offering  extended benefits. If 
the pre-1981  law had been in effect, all fifty states would have been 
participating,  as they were during  the 1975-76  recession. Over  the seven 
quarters  from  January  1981  through  September  1982,  a weekly average 
of only 330,000  workers  was covered by extended  benefits. In 1975-76, 
when the total number  of jobless was about 17 percent smaller, the 
number  of workers covered by extended benefits averaged 535,000 a 
week. Some part  of the decline is due to the relative drop in claimants 
under  regular  UI programs,  since as the number  of these claimants  falls 
17. Thus the trigger  rate used before 1981  was not identical  to the published  IUR, 
which  excludes  recipients  of extended  benefits  from  the numerator. 244  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
the number  who will exhaust benefits and apply for extended benefits 
also falls. This factor accounts for less than half of the observed drop, 
however, since the number  of new regular  claimants  was down only 
about 16 percent while the number  of extended benefit claimants  was 
down 38 percent. One indirect  effect of the decline in insured  regular 
claimants  is the  decline  in  the  IUR, which  triggers  state  extended  benefits. 
Presumably,  even under  the  revised  trigger  mechanism,  agreaterfraction 
of states  would  qualify  for these benefits  if the IUR were  one-fifth  higher. 
Until October 1982,  the unemployment  insurance  system offered no 
income protection beyond thirty-nine  weeks in states qualifying  for 
extended benefits and beyond twenty-six weeks in those states not 
qualifying  for those benefits. This was in marked  contrast  to experience 
in the 1975-76  recession when  federal  supplemental  benefits  (FSB)  were 
available. The FSB program  began in January  1975, only six months 
after  unemployment  began  its rapid  rise in 1974.  This  program  extended 
the potential  duration  of unemployment  insurance  payments  in all states 
by twenty-six weeks, to a total of about sixty-five weeks. During 1975 
and 1976, a weekly average of 1.1 million recipients  were covered by 
FSB, or about 14 percent of the average number  of unemployed.  The 
federal supplemental  compensation  (FSC) program,  which took effect 
in October 1982,  is similar  in most respects to the earlier  FSB program, 
but is considerably  less generous. While the earlier  program  extended 
potential benefits by twenty-six weeks, the FSC program  now offers 
only an added eight weeks of  benefits in states with low  insured 
unemployment  and an added sixteen weeks in states with high insured 
rates. States with intermediate  rates receive an intermediate  number  of 
additional  weeks. 
Figure 2 shows the fraction of all unemployed  covered by regular, 
extended, and supplemental  unemployment  insurance  programs.  The 
shaded area in this figure represents the fraction of the unemployed 
receiving  unemployment  insurance  under  the supplemental  unemploy- 
ment assistance and FSB programs  in 1975-77  and the FSC program  in 
1982. It is evident from this figure  that the absence of a supplemental 
program  before October 1982  is an important  reason for the difference 
in coverage between the 1975-76 and 1981-82 periods. The restricted 
nature  of the extended benefit  program  in 1981-82  is another  important 
factor. 
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Figure 2.  Fraction of Unemployed  Covered by Unemployment  Insurance 
Programs, 1947-82 
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in figure  2 is the enormous  decline in the fraction  of unemployed  collect- 
ing insurance  under any program  in the recent period, particularly  in 
comparison  to 1975-76. Only about  45 percent  of the unemployed  were 
covered by unemployment  insurance  in 1982;  nearly 78 percent were 
receiving  jobless benefits  in 1975.  Some critics of unemployment  insur- 
ance might  fault the comparison  with 1975-76  because benefits in that 
period  were unusually  generous,  lasting  up to sixty-five  weeks irrespec- 
tive of a worker's  financial  need. However, even in  comparison  to earlier 
recessions when unemployment  insurance  was less generous, benefits 
provided  in 1981-82  covered an unusually  small fraction  of the unem- 
ployed. Except during  the comparatively  mild recession in 1970-71, at 
least 56 percent of the unemployed  received  jobless benefits in every 246  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
postwar recession through 1977. Since that year fewer than half the 
unemployed  have been covered by  jobless benefits. 
Implications 
A principal  reason why the number  of jobless collecting unemploy- 
ment  benefits  was low during  the 1981-82  recession is that  the president 
and Congress  decided it should be low. By significantly  tightening  the 
trigger  mechanism  in the extended benefit  program  and failing  to enact 
a supplemental  program  similar to the one available in 1975-77, the 
administration  and  Congress  essentially  denied  jobless benefits  to a large 
fraction of workers who would have been eligible to receive benefits 
during  the 1970s. There is no mystery about why this occurred. Inter- 
preting  the 1980  election results  as a mandate  for less spending  on social 
insurance  and welfare programs,  public policymakers  reduced the in- 
come protection  available  to workers  during  long spells of joblessness. 
Some of the specific reforms, such as the elimination  of the national 
trigger  for extended benefits, were quite sensible. But the collective 
effect of the reforms  was to significantly  reduce income protection  and 
countercyclical  stimulus  from  unemployment  compensation  in the midst 
of the worst economic downturn  since the Great  Depression. 
The decision to significantly  reduce the potential  duration  of unem- 
ployment  benefits  coincided  with  an  unexpected  drop  in the IUR relative 
to the TUR. The former is computed solely on the basis of statistics 
compiled under the regular  twenty-six-week  program,  and so it is not 
directly affected by the reforms  in the extended benefit  program  or by 
the failure  to enact a supplementary  program.  Yet the relative number 
of short-term  job losers covered by regular  jobless benefits  dropped  by 
22 percent. Contributing  to this decline was a 16 percent drop in the 
fraction  of new  job losers who filed  initial  claims  for regular  benefits. 
The 16 percent drop in new applications  cannot be explained  easily 
with  available  data.  However, on the basis  of indirect  evidence  it appears 
that  there  has  been no significant  drop  in the  technical  eligibility  of recent 
job losers. It is extremely suggestive, for example, that Ul offices are 
finding  a higher  proportion  of applicants  to be eligible  for benefits  than 
were found  eligible  in the past. According  to CPS  data,  the demographic 
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is, if anything,  consistent with an above-average  application  rate. Simi- 
larly, the employment  experience of job losers appears  to be no worse 
now than it was in the mid-1970s,  when application  rates for regular 
benefits were much higher. Legally and administratively,  the main 
changes in the regular  Ul program  since 1978 have been the implicit 
taxation  of private  pension and social security  benefits, the imposition 
of federal  and  state taxation  on Ul benefits  paid  to high-income  families, 
and perhaps a cut in the number  of offices in which benefits can be 
claimed. For certain  Ul applicants  these reforms  significantly  reduced 
the after-tax  value  of Ul benefits  or  raised  the costs of application.  These 
reforms seem to me to be insufficient  to explain much of the drop in 
initial claims in recent years. Nonetheless, they provide a plausible 
explanation  for some of the decline. 
The unexpected relative fall in the IUR brings into question its 
continued usefulness as a trigger for extended or supplemental  Ul 
programs. In principle, the ideal unemployment rate trigger would 
measure  how difficult  it is for typical workers  to find  jobs should they 
become unemployed.  The duration  of unemployment  insurance  protec- 
tion could then be tied directly to the difficulty  of finding  a job. This 
permits  the unemployment  insurance  system to provide  job losers with 
a relatively constant degree of income protection, irrespective  of the 
current  state of the labor  market.  The simplest  measure  of the difficulty 
of job finding  is what might be called the job loser rate-the  ratio of 
current  job losers to the number  of currently  employed. By excluding 
any  measure  of the situation  ofjob leavers, new entrants,  and  reentrants, 
the job loser rate focuses squarely on the job prospects faced by the 
population  insured  by unemployment  insurance-job losers. 
If the job loser rate is used as the standard,  the IUR has become an 
increasingly  poor measure of labor market  conditions. Figure  3 shows 
the relation between the seasonally adjusted  job loser rate and the 
seasonally adjusted IUR for 1967:1  through 1982:4. Before 1980 the 
quarter-to-quarter  movements  in  these two indicators  were quite  similar, 
although  the IUR tended  to fall  faster  after  the trough  of a recession  than 
did  the  job loser rate.  '8 Since 1980  there  has been a marked  departure  of 
18. The difference  occurs  because the IUR excludes  from  the numerator  virtually  all 
job losers who have been unemployed  longer than twenty-six weeks and hence have 
exhausted  regularjobless  benefits.  These  long-termjob  losers  are  included  in  the  numerator 
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the IUR from its previous relation to job loss,  for all the reasons 
mentioned above. The IUR, for example, seems to show that the job 
market  situation  was not markedly  worse at the end of 1982  than it was 
at the low point of the 1970-71 contraction. The job loser rate, by 
contrast, was more than twice as high  in 1982:3  as in 1970:4.  Since the 
job loser rate seems to conform more closely with other measures of 
economic performance (payroll employment and GNP growth, for 
example), the IUR has apparently  lost much  of its value as an indicator 
of employment  prospects  forjob losers. 
Any substitute for the IUR in triggering  extended jobless benefits 
should meet three criteria. It must specifically  reflect  the labor  market 
situation of persons insured by unemployment  insurance. It must be 
available  in a timely manner,  either  weekly or monthly.  And it must be 
available  on a state-by-state  basis. The  job loser rate  meets the first  two 
of these criteria, but not the third  because the CPS data sample is too 
small to permit  accurate  estimation  of the number  of job losers in each 
state. Hence any reform  of the trigger  mechanism  for extended  benefits 
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the unemployment  insurance  system, which are accurate  on the state 
level. 
The trigger  mechanism  could be substantially  improved  by using the 
job loser rate as a national trigger  that determines  the number  of added 
weeks of extended benefits  to be available,  on average, throughout  the 
country. Individual  states would then be allocated specific increments 
in benefit  duration  in proportion  to their  local insured  rates, with states 
having  a low IUR receiving  very small  increments  and  those with a high 
IUR, much larger increments. While this proposal does not entirely 
circumvent defects of the IUR as a measure of local labor market 
conditions, it at least makes it impossible for the extended benefit 
program  to be reduced  as the labor  situation  worsens-the  situation  that 
occurred  in 1981-82. 
Whatever  its fate in triggering  extended unemployment  benefits, the 
insured  unemployment  rate should be temporarily  retired  as a serious 
measure  of labor  market  conditions. Comments 
and Discussion 
Lawrence H.  Summers: This valuable paper begins with a striking 
empirical  fact. During  1982  about  45 percent  of the unemployed  received 
unemployment  insurance  benefits, compared  with 78 percent in 1975. 
Burtless  is careful  to separate  this decline  into two components.  In part, 
the decline in the fraction  of the unemployed  receiving  unemployment 
insurance (UI) reflects conscious choices by policymakers. Congress 
chose not to reenact the federal supplemental  benefits program  that 
prolonged  UI coverage to sixty-five  weeks during  1975  and 1976.  It also 
enacted legislation cutting back on the extended benefit program  by 
raising  state "trigger"  levels. But  this  is not  the whole story. The  insured 
unemployment  rate, which counts only persons covered under  regular 
state UI programs,  has declined sharply  relative to the overall unem- 
ployment rate in the past several years. As Burtless notes, the total 
unemployment  rate  in 1982  exceeded the insured  unemployment  rate  by 
5.0 percent  compared  to a gap of only 2.6 percent  in 1975. 
I want first  to comment  on the decline in the insured  unemployment 
rate. Burtless  begins by showing  that  a regression  of insured  unemploy- 
ment  on the number  of recentjob  losers has significant  negative  residuals 
in recent years. He concludes from this that there is a puzzle to be 
explained and looks for clues. As a check on his procedure  I used the 
May 1976  job search survey in which individuals  report  both reason  for 
unemployment  and whether they are collecting UI. I found that about 
30 percent of job losers were not collecting UI, and that more than 20 
percent of UI beneficiaries  were classified  as job leavers or reentrants. 
Perhaps  it would  be useful  to explore  more  carefully  the relation  between 
the breakdown  of unemployment  by reason and the insured  unemploy- 
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ment  rate.  Similarly,  I suspect  Burtless'  s regressions  of new Ul claimants 
on recent  job losses could also be improved. 
Burtless finds that a large part of the aberrant  behavior of insured 
unemployment  during  the recent recession is a consequence of fewer 
persons claiming  benefits than would have been predicted from past 
historical relations. He attributes  at least part of this decline to the 
taxation  of Ul benefits and to the reformed  treatment  of pensions and 
social security income in determining  Ul benefits. I find  the tax expla- 
nation  implausible.  Many  Ul recipients  were not subject  to tax particu- 
larly in 1980  and 1981  before the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act lowered the income floors. Recall that the taxes on unemployment 
insurance  are typically at low rates and there is no withholding.  Only 
Jack Kemp could think that a 33 percent tax payable in a year could 
deter  someone from applying  for Ul. 
My guess is that it is the perception  of tightened  eligibility  rules and 
more rigorous  enforcement  that accounts for the decline in the number 
of Ul claimants. Certainly  the new administration  tried to convey this 
impression.  I have  been told  but  cannot  cite evidence  that  when "welfare 
crackdowns" are announced  in individual  states the welfare rolls con- 
tract even if no real changes are implemented.  Burtless  challenges  this 
interpretation  by noting that disqualification  rates have not increased. 
This is not inconsistent with my story. By deterring  potential  cheaters 
from trying to get benefits, a crackdown might actually reduce the 
disqualification  rate. To take a parallel  example,  a very successful  police 
force might  find  that  it had  to make  very few arrests. 
The second part  of Burtless's  paper  is written  from  the heart;  no effort 
is made to conduct the sort of careful examination  of evidence that 
characterizes  the first part. He makes no secret of where he stands 
regarding  current  policy, writing  "Some of the specific  reforms  . . . were 
quite  sensible. But  the collective effect of the reforms  was to significantly 
reduce  income protection  and  countercyclical  stimulus  from  unemploy- 
ment compensation  in the midst of the worst economic downturn  since 
the Great  Depression.  " Obviously  valuejudgments  are  crucial  here. But 
Burtless does not look very hard  at the facts. Few believe that recent 
fiscal policy has been too restrictive. Indeed the ratio of disposable 
income  to GNP was 0.71 in 1982,  its highest  level since 1950.  What  about 
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supplementary  benefits  went to secondary  workers.  Close to half of the 
beneficiaries  were married  women  and  a substantial  fraction  were under 
age twenty-five. Only one-seventh of beneficiaries of these federal 
supplements  provided  sole support  for a family. 
A  thorough exploration of  the merits of  current unemployment 
insurance  policies would require  an analysis of the trade-off  between 
adverse incentives created by the Ul  system and the benefits of the 
insurance  it provides. The latter consideration  depends on the charac- 
teristics  of Ul beneficiaries  and  the extent to which  their  unemployment 
is forecastable. The former depends on a number of aspects of the 
behavior of both employees and their employers. A comparison of 
current  levels of unemployment  insurance  with past levels is hardly  a 
sufficient  basis for analysis. Without  a more careful analysis than the 
paper  provides, policy conclusions are not warranted. 
General Discussion 
Robert Solow suggested that the insured unemployment  statistics 
may  be increasingly  understating  true  unemployment  because  of the rise 
in women's participation  in the labor  force. In Switzerland,  which  bases 
its labor force statistics on unemployment  insurance rather than on 
sample surveys, economists suspect that a portion  of joblessness goes 
unrecorded  because women  fail to collect the unemployment  benefits  to 
which they are entitled. Martin  Neil Baily added that the same male- 
female differential  in registering  for benefits  was observed  in the United 
Kingdom, where unemployment  insurance statistics are also used to 
measure  joblessness. Burtless  reported  that a smaller  fraction  of unem- 
ployed women than unemployed men receive jobless benefits in the 
United States, though this did not necessarily mean that a smaller 
fraction of eligible unemployed  women collected benefits. It is likely 
that  a smaller  fraction  of the women  unemployed  are  eligible  for benefits 
because a greater  fraction  are new entrants  and reentrants  to the labor 
market.  While  the increase  in the number  of women participating  in the 
labor  force has been important  in the decline of the IUR/TUR  ratio, the 
rise in the number  of young labor force participants  in the 1960s and 
early 1970s  was also important. 
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reduction  in unemployment  insurance  paid in the recent recession may 
have moderated wage demands, there was a spirited discussion of 
whether wage growth had moderated  more than one might have ex- 
pected. James  Duesenberry  was impressed  by how closely most existing 
Phillips curve equations have been predicting  recent wage inflation. 
George Perry  agreed  with Duesenberry  that a short-run  Phillips  curve 
model could explain  wage inflation  fairly  well through  most of 1981  and 
1982,  but thought  that wage growth  in recent months  had slowed more 
than  those models  would  predict.  He observed  that  one should  expect a 
prolonged  and deep recession to induce shifts in wage norms  by now, 
which would account  for the low rate of wage inflation  thus far in 1983. 
William  Fellner thought  the evidence for an unexpected drop in wage 
inflation went back further than 1983, but agreed that it might take 
several consecutive quarters  of overpredictions  before one could be 
confident  that  wage inflation  was really  unexpectedly  low. 
Baily pointed out an apparent  inconsistency between the view that 
wage inflation  was more  moderate  than  expected in 1982  because of low 
jobless benefits  and  the often-heard  view that  a growing  fraction  of those 
reporting  themselves as unemployed  are not actively seeking  work. The 
former view suggests that wage demands  were restrained  because an 
unusually  large  number  of the unemployed  were  in serious  need  of earned 
income since they were not receiving  benefits. The latter view asserts 
that an unusually  large number  of the reported  unemployed  were not 
seriously  looking  for work  and  could  not be expected to keep down  wage 
demands. 
Burtless  responded  to the criticism  of Summers,  that  the ratio  of value 
judgment  to fact was high in the second section of the paper. He noted 
that value  judgments  were nowhere  stated in the text, although  readers 
or critics might form their own. With respect to the point made by 
Summers,  that disposable  income held up well in the 1981-82  recession 
despite the relative decline in unemployment  compensation, Burtless 
noted  that  the composition  of disposable  income  had evidently  changed 
in comparison to earlier recessions, with the long-term  unemployed 
receiving relatively less.  Apart from whatever value judgments one 
might  draw  from this, the previous pattern  of unemployment  compen- 
sation would have provided a still stronger  automatic  stabilizer  to the 
economy without  permanently  enlarging  the structural  budget  deficit. 